How can monetary policy be improved? by Paul A. Samuelson
Panel Discussian
Paul A. Samuelson*
We academics hold at least two different views of central banking.
The first looks on it as an arcane and mysterious craft--something really
too dangerous to leave to central bankers. Only we dogmatic scholars
can be entrusted to prescribe for it in our seminars. And in accordance
with the dictum that nature abhors a vacuum, economists have rushed
forward in great numbers to supply the nostrums we think the real
world practitioners need to have prescribed to them. As will be
enumerated, within my own lifetime as an economist, I have seen rule
after rule prescribed. Each rule came and each rule went. One thing all
the rule-makers have agreed upon is that, while each past rule was
ill-conceived, now the correct one finally has been arrived at.
The second way of looking at central banking is almost the reverse
of all that. It holds that what central banking requires is essentially a
little good sense. Note that I did not speak of common sense, because
good sense is anything but common. To run the Bank of England or the
Federal Reserve, you must keep your focus on the time profiles of the
price level and of real output-employment levels and be prepared to
lean against the perverse winds affecting them. Notice that I specify two
goals, and not simply the goal of the price level, as the concern of the
central bank. God gave us two eyes and we ought to use them
both whatever the constitutions of the Bundesbank and the Bank of
New Zealand say, and despite the rhetoric of recent presidents at some
Ohio branch of the Federal Reserve System.
I personally incline toward this second view. My skepticism toward
each new proposed nondiscretionary rule comes from their analyzed
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non-optimality in achieving a tolerably satisfactory society with limited
gyrations in price levels and in utilization of resources.
The independent central banks of the past and present~ when we
score them objectively, have not been doing very good jobs. It is
ironical, therefore, that they enjoy such current popularity among
people of affairs everywhere. Price levels are generally not stationary;
and in those places where inflation rates have been somewhat tamed,
this has not been the result of costless improvements in "credibility."
The costs--both in Europe and Japan--have been intense in terms of
lost output and productivity.
Our Fed, in my reading, has done a much better job than the
Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Canada, and the like. Two
of its finest moments came first, when Paul Volcker helped bring down
our stagflation; and then in 1982, when Volcker flouted Bundesbank
dogmas and, in strong contradiction to the dicta of the Lucas-Sargent
New Classicists, took an activist position promoting the desirable
1983-89 recovery. Alan Greenspan in turn earned his A in the handling
of the October 1987 stock market crash.
From 1989 to 1991, the Fed was somewhat too late and too little in
leaning against the wind of the 1990-91 recession. But in comparison
with the Banks of France, Spain, and Italy, the Fed earned brownie
points. If it had stuck to a goal of a stationary price level by 1995-96 (a la
the Neal Amendment and much current dogma), its grade in my
classroom would have fallen significantly--and so would have the U.S.
Main Street economy.
For fifty years the Fed has not seemed to me mysterious or
perverse. Like the old farmer who found his donkey by asking himself,
"’Where would I go if I were a jackass?" I could mostly guess in which
direction the Fed would move. This despite its own talk. Who remem-
bers "bills only" from Chairman Martin’s days? Or 100 percent money
from Chicago petitions and Irving Fisher books? Or the automatic gold
standard along with money creation to meet the legitimate rediscount-
ing demands of manufacturing, trade, and agriculture? Fixed gold
reserve ratios? Or fixed marginal reserve ratios, for gold? Or separation
of the Bank of England’s sections for currency and credit lending? Or
prefrozen rates of growth for M2, for M1, for high-powered M0, or for
M17 1/2? Only we older economists remember them.
Only professors of the chair believe that a sophisticated group exists
out there in the bond market who need to be coaxed into credibility. The
truth is that the people out there primarily do not have independent
judgments about the objective probabilities of inflation. What they do
have is non-paranoid fears about what the Fed is going to do. A veritable
terror used to occur every Thursday, when the M numbers came out. It
cut short the Long Island weekends of the whole bond fraternity. A
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bonds. This was not because traders believed in monetarism. I knew
those guys. What they believed (somewhat wrongly) was that the Fed
believed in monetarism. And so it has been. When Dr. Greenspan says
he must do this or that to be in accord with the bond market, I am
reminded of a monkey who for the first time has seen a mirror. He sees
an image of himself in the mirror and thinks that by looking at the
reactions of that monkey--including its surprises--he is getting new
information. Well, what Greenspan is getting from the market is what
the market heard Greenspan say before, that the Fed is getting worried
about inflation, independently worried. Now the truth is, those guys
have a lot to lose on overnight decisions. And they are very worried
about what the Federal Reserve is going to do.
Somebody, it could have been Charles Goodhart, enunciated a
[Goodhart’s] law. I will vulgarize it out of ignorance. "As soon as you
identify a good rule, it self-destructs." Well, I think that chap had it
almost right. The simpler fact, though, is that there was never any truth
to self-destruct, to destroy itself, in any of the rules. All of the simple
nostrums, things I have enumerated and the ones that I have spared
you, failed as universal rules, being right only a small amount of the
time. And in Darwinian fashion, we only stay with a fad while it is in
phase with the moon. Each new fad is really like new Kleenex; it just has
not yet been contaminated, and can get a short run for its money.
What alone is left? I think what is left is good sense--which, alas, is
eclectic and very hard to recognize. Most of the discussions that I have
heard here have to do with a fundamental distrust of democracy. A
populist democracy is even more distrusted. We are looking for ways of
putting into a constitution restrictions that shield the decisionmakers
from populist democracy. In the end, that is not going to work; it is only
going to make the constitution itself a yo-yo instrument in which
amendment number 67 is going to repeal amendment number 55 in the
fashion of one of our own amendments with respect to liquor. Bertold
Brecht once said, "The government is displeased with the people. It’s
going to disband the people and get itself a new set of people." Actually,
central bankers, like the rest of us, must live with the only political
system we have or will ever have.